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Exploitative Abuses: Which Competition Policy, Which Public Policy? 
 






As the final session of the day, my aim in this paper is to briefly outline the nature of 
exploitative abuses before turning to the question of the relationship between competition law 
and intellectual property law in the context of what Teubner calls the regulatory trilemma and 
from that draw a two-fold conclusion.  First, the demands on law from the social phenomenon 
of markets are more acute when those demands raise issues across the different law 
domains of IP and competition. Second, where IP law and competition meet, the aim should 
be for both domains to internalise the values of the other.  This however can only happen to 
the extent but only to the extent that there can be what Collins
1 calls productive 
disintegration.  Finally, in the specific context of exploitative abuses the overlap between IP 
law and competition law arises primarily in relation to claims of excessive pricing in licensing 
arrangements.  Such claims could form the basis of a private action
2 or can be made in the 
context of compulsory dealing decisions such as Microsoft.
3  The involvement of competition 
agencies in pricing decisions goes to the heart of concerns about the nature of competition 
law and the role of competition agencies and highlights the need for the law to indirectly 




Instances of exploitative abuses - those abuses which result in direct loss of consumer 
welfare – are often compared to exclusionary abuses which exclude competitors from the 
market.
4 Exclusionary abuses are the primary focus of A82 with exploitative abuses 
uncommon.
5  The primary example of such an abuse is excessive pricing defined by the ECJ 
as a price that has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied.
6  
Where such prices have the effect of curbing parallel trade or unfairly exploiting customers 
then it falls within A82.
7  Excessive pricing is caught under A82(a) which prohibits the 
charging of unfair prices thus prices that are unfairly high are prohibited.
8  The failure of the 
Commission in United Brands
9 to prove excessive pricing before the ECJ meant that it was 
more inclined to invoke discriminatory pricing than excessive pricing when alleging abuse 
under A82.
10 In fact, excessive pricing has only been found by the ECJ in two cases: British 
Leyland
11 and Hilti
12.  In both cases, as Temple Lang notes, the prices found to be excessive 
were four to six times the prices charged by the same company for the same service at the 
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3 EC Commission, IP/07/269 1 March 2007, Microsoft warned of further penalties over unreasonable pricing available 
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same time in the same geographic market.
13  More recently, excessive pricing has been 
raised by the Commission in Deutsche Post II,
14 and the Port of Helsinborg
15 decisions and 
by the UK CAT in NAPP
16 and in the English Court of Appeal.
17  Excessive pricing is 
addressed also ex ante through regulatory frameworks in relation to those sectors where 
entry barriers are particularly high and state monopolies were previously the norm i.e. utilities 
and communications. 
Outside of this specific regulatory environment, competition law rightly shies away from 
alleging excessive pricing for three reasons.  First, substantively there is no satisfactory legal 
test that will allow effective benchmarking of prices to determine when prices are excessively 
high especially in innovative markets.
18 The two step test is whether the difference between 
the costs actually incurred and the price actually charged is excessive and if so, whether a 
price has been imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to competing 
products.
19 Evans and Padilla point out that not only is the test highly ambiguous but also 
entirely subjective. The EC Commission in the Port of Helsinborg decision rightly rejected a 
‘costs + reasonable profit’ approach to determining excessive pricing.
20 A positive difference 
between price and production cost did not automatically imply prices were unfair. In that 
particular decision, it noted the high sunk costs for the ferry and no-cost factors like the 
intangible value of the location of the port had to be considered.  A similar approach can be 
seen in the English Court of Appeal decision in Attheraces where the first instance finding of 
excessive pricing was overturned because the appellate court was of the view that a costs+ 
test takes too narrow a view of what constitutes economic value.  In particular it does not 
have regard to the value to the purchaser of the product of service.
21   
Second, under both US and EC competition law monopolisation and dominance are not 
prohibited.  Given the economic view of dominance as that of the ability to charge prices 
significantly higher than the competitive level it is problematic if not paradoxical to view 
excessive pricing as abusive given it goes to the definition of dominance.
22 Finally, 
institutionally, if there is a finding of excessive pricing a competition agency may look like it is 
imposing price controls which runs counter to the raison d’etre of competition law facilitating 
competitive markets where prices are allowed to find their own level to the benefit of 
consumer welfare.  In fact, excessive pricing can be unproblematic – if a dominant 
undertaking charges monopoly rents, provided there is no market foreclosure then the 
competitive forces of the market will ensure that new entrants or existing incumbents will 
intervene and compete on price.  Even less efficient competitors may act as a constraint on 
dominant firms.
23 Excessive pricing can even promote consumer welfare where the ability to 
charge high prices encourage innovation.  
Given the difficulties of evaluation, remedy and the conceptual integration of dominance and 
pricing, Evans and Padilla warn of the high risk of errors with excessive pricing either wrongly 
condemned (type I error) or wrongly acquitted (type II error).
24  The difficulty is that of 
devising a sufficiently realistic legal test that will allow dominant undertakings to make pricing 
decisions that will be predictably legal.
25   Evans and Padilla for this reason suggest that 
excessive pricing should only be alleged in obvious, serious and indefensible cases.
26  This of 
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16 CA98/2/2001. NAPP 15 January 2002 Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal 
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CEMFI Working Paper No. 0416 September 2004 ftp://ftp.cemfi.es/wp/04/0416.pdf at 3. 
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20 Comp/A.36.568/D3 23 July 2004 
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21 Attheraces Ltd. V. British Racing Board [2007] EWCA Civ. 38 (2 Feb 2007) from para 148. 
22 Yannis Katsoulacos, Exploitative Practices in Article 82’ (2006) European Enterprise Journal * 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. at 4.  See generally K. Schrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality University of California Press, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles 1991 espec. Ch. 9.  
25 Richard Whish, Competition Law 5
th ed. Butterworth London  2003 p. 689  
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course begs the question to some extent: when are cases obvious, serious and indefensible?  
The NAPP case I suggest comes close to meeting the test.  NAPP was fined for excessive 
pricing of its sustained release morphine drug in the community (general practitioner) market. 
On appeal NAPP had argued that account had to be taken of the need to recoup for 
investment in R&D in a dynamic market with pricing evaluated on a port-folio basis for a range 
of products. While the Tribunal seemed to accept the principle of the argument, it was 
rejected in this case.  The drug in issue had been put on the market in 1980.  There was no 
evidence put forward as to the costs that had to be recouped and, given the time frame; it was 
taken as given that recoupment had taken place long before the decision.   The pricing in the 
case was evaluated under both price-costs margin and price benchmarking tests (a 
preponderance of the evidence standard). NAPP was found to have earned 80% profit under 
the price-costs margin test with its nearest competitor earning less than 70% and under price 
benchmarking its prices were 33-67% higher than those of its competitors in 2000 – the year 
before the initial decision.  In the community market prices were over 10 times those in 
hospitals and 4-7 times higher than NAPP’s own export prices.  But NAPP is and should 
remain the exceptional case leaving excessive pricing as a possible basis for an A82 action 
but only one to be invoked rarely.     
Evans and Padilla suggest a modified per se test as a means of limiting the risk of error.  
Excessive prices would be per se legal save in exceptional circumstances defined as: (a) 
firms have a near monopoly position in the market which is not the result of part investments 
or innovations, and which is protected by insurmountable legal barriers to entry; (b) the prices 
charged by the firm widely exceed its average total costs; and (c) there is a risk that those 
prices may prevent the emergence of new goods and services in adjacent markets. The test 
is cumulative and the final requirement is explicitly reminiscent of the Magill and IMS tests
27 
where refusal to licence can constitute an abuse if it prevents the sale of a new product for 
which there is potential consumer demand.  The requirements are cumulative under the 
proposed test and the new product rule as well as tying it to the compulsory licensing cases 
also ties it firmly to exclusion – market entry to adjacent markets is restricted through the 
excessive pricing.  Thus excessive pricing is redefined as exclusionary rather than merely 
exploitative underlining once again the difficulty of alleging excessive pricing under A82EC.   
 
IPR and Competition 
 
From a sociological perspective markets require three legal tools in order to function: 
property, contract and good governance.
28  These tools are necessarily complimentary but, 
insofar as they are normatively distinct or closed to each other, tension can exist between 
them.  Competition law is one aspect of the governance of markets and, like IP law shares the 
overlapping but not exclusive objective of promoting innovation in the market.  As subsystems 
of law, they are normatively closed but also linked (or structurally coupled to use the language 
of autopoiesis)
29 through the social phenomena of markets and innovation.  It is this 
combination of linkage and closure that is a source of tension.  This tension is compounded 
by the demands that are made on law in general and on both these domains of law in 
particular by the social phenomenon that they are called on to address.  This is not just a 
matter of what is often called ‘regulatory drag’ although in dynamic high tech markets 
regulatory drag may be an inevitable feature of the law.  Other factors such as the extent to 
which laws adopted are a response to intense lobbying – which is a hallmark of intellectual 
property laws generally including those adopted within the field of competition law – are also 
relevant.
30  Irrespective of the institutional or public choice features of the domain, regard is 
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28 N Fligstein and I Mara-Drita, ‘How To Make a Market: Reflections on the Attempt to Create a Single Market in the 
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had to the theoretical underpinnings of law and its role and nature of the modern state.  By 
adopting this perspective, it is hoped to shed some light on the question posed in the title. 
 
The Regulatory Trilemma 
 
Juridification is –as Teubner suggests – an ugly word and one that is difficult to define.
31  The 
context of juridification is the changing and increasing demands on law in the modern 
regulatory state with law used as a means of control to constitutionalise the economy.
32  
Juridification is not defined by a proliferation of laws but as a process in which the 
interventionist state produces a new type of law, regulatory law which specifies conduct in 
order to achieve particular substantive ends.
33 Given juridification is different from the mere 
proliferation of law, the ambition should not be to attempt to stop ‘legalisation’ instead the aim 
should be to channel law so as to avoid or minimise any negative side-effects.  This in 
essence defines the review processes that has been ongoing in relation to EC competition 
law generally and A82 specifically.   
Formal rationality which is a hallmark of law is being changed by the process of juridification 
such that material rationality is to the fore and is defined by reference to function, legitimation 
and norm structure.
34  In relation to function, law is no longer exclusively concerned with 
conflict resolution but increasingly with political intervention.  The political sphere has taken 
on responsibility for many social processes and in turn requires the definition of goals, the 
choice of normative means and their implementation.  Competition law has not been entirely 
instrumentalised by this process – thanks in part to its influential episteme of legal 
practitioners
35 and the high level of technical expertise and discourse that operates in the field 
– although within the specific context of the EC the fact that competition decisions are taken 
by the full College of Commissioners allows some scope for instrumentalisation and 
substantively, the emphasis on market integration has also proved a powerful driver in the 
first 50 years of the EC rules.   
The basis of legitimation is no longer exclusively traditional values and goals encapsulated 
within the rule of law.  There is an increasing emphasis on result orientation institutionally and 
substantively. Agencies who implement these laws are required to justify their role through 
reference e.g. to value for money, performance indicators and benchmarking under better 
regulation initiatives.  The success of a policy field is defined by reference to what political 
scientists refer to as output legitimacy
36 and this can be seen in the form of self-evaluation 
contained in competition agency annual reports. This emphasis on outputs can also lead to 
general questions being raised in the context of specific cases.  Thus the question ‘who 
wins?’ is raised not just in relation to the parties of the action but more widely in relation to 
(economics-defined) consumer welfare.  In IP competition cases this can be particularly 
pertinent and difficult to answer given the tensions that can arise in relation to concerns about 
market foreclosure, freedom of contract, and innovation.  
 For example in Microsoft the requirement to deal was not limited to any particular customer 
creating an unusually wide obligation to deal, and the issue of whether innovation was 
adversely affected was argued from two radically different perspectives with Microsoft arguing 
that the incentive to innovate would be removed by the obligation to deal while the 
Commission argued that any negative effect on Microsoft’s incentive to innovate was offset 
against by the positive effect of innovation for the whole industry.
37  Finally the structure of 
regulatory law is characterised by a weakening of the idea of generality and methods of 
interpretation with increasing discretion and particularisation of the law.  The law is 
                                                           
31 Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions in Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott nod Christopher Hood (eds.), A 
Reader on Regulation OUP Oxford 1998 at 389. 
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33 G. Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions in Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott nod Christopher 
Hood (eds.), A Reader on Regulation OUP Oxford 1998 at 405.  
34 Ibid. 401. 
35 F. van Waarden and M. Drahos, ‘Courts and (Epistemic) Communities in the Convergence of Competition Politics’ 
(2002) 9(6) Journal of European Public Policy 913-934. 
36 Christopher Lord, *  
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increasingly purpose orientated (in keeping with the result orientation legitimation) and 
dependent on social science thinking that can measure outputs and define legal function.
38
Drawing on Weber, Teubner suggests that law is on the one hand increasingly formalised to 
the extent that it is self-referential and professionalized.  On the other hand, it is becoming 
increasingly instrumentalised and is more and more exposed to the demands of politics and 
of regulated areas of life.
39  This paradox of increasing autonomy of law and its increasing 
interdependence creates a tension wherein regulatory law can only trigger self-regulatory 
processes rather than seek to control social processes directly.  The self-referential nature of 
social systems makes anything more direct impossible.  If law tries to intervene over and 
beyond the extent it is possible within the autopoietic social system then this gives rise to the 
regulatory trilemma
40 i.e. one of three things can happen: 
•  The law is ignored as irrelevant and has no impact; 
•  It produces disintegrating effects on the social system; or 
•  It produces disintegrating effects for law itself. 
The solutions to this trilemma are many including a focus on implementation, deregulation (in 
particular reliance on cost-benefit analysis – which Teubner criticises for the fact that 
economic costs are more readily calculable than social costs
41), and, the approach favoured 
by Teubner, proceduralisation, which is the control of self-regulation.
42 The strength of this 
fairly pessimistic but ultimately realistic approach is that it acknowledges the limits of law and 
hence advocates indirect control through a focus on the regulation of organisation, 
procedures and the redistribution of competences.
43 He specifically refers to the negotiated 
outcomes in merger law as an example of such negotiated regulation.  The aim is to replace 
direct state control with effective internal control through incentives and legal strategies.  Thus 
by recognising the limits of the law, it can be put to best effect in the social world and thereby 
avoid the risk of either social or legal disintegration.   
Regulatory law in this context is not understood in the narrow sense of state intervention to 
prevent market failure
44 but in the wider sense of law having a role beyond conflict resolution 
where function, legitimation and structure have been re-defined.  Black’s definition: the 
intentional activity of attempting to control, order or influence the behaviour of others
45 is 
more useful for our purposes as it can encapsulate competition law provided control is 
construed as indirect control.    In other words, the analysis is not predicated on the 
conventional dichotomy between competition and regulation but seeks to distinguish the 
modern phenomenon of the simultaneously increasing formal law and the instrumentalised 
law.  The challenge is to locate competition law and IP law within that framework. 
 
Competition and IP Law: Subsystems of law 
 
Teubner’s analysis is at a high level of abstraction.  While he draws examples from labour 
law, consumer law, competition law, he does not address the regulatory trilemma that can 
arise in relation to the not just to the social subsystems of politics, markets but also between 
legal subsystems such as competition law and IP law. While IP and competition law may 
share overlapping objectives they remain autonomous but overlapping normative subsystems 
of law.  This view is one re-enforced in the current debate which seeks to remove the 
distinction between intellectual property rights and other property rights.
46  Lianos questions 
this trend, which for antitrust purposes at least, is accepted in US law.
47 He notes that IP 
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44 See e.g. Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory Hart, Oxford  2004 pp. 1-3. 
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rights are for a defined period, there are conditions for validity of patents which has no parallel 
in tangible property law and, critically in his view, the creation of IP is contingent on the 
intervention of a regulatory agency.  In other words, intellectual property rights have a public 
dimension that is almost entirely absent from ownership of tangible property.  The 
Fundamental Rights Charter of the EU extends the right to property to intellectual property.
48  
The Charter is of course not binding – yet – and the ECJ does not seem to have formed a firm 
view as the conflation or distinction between IP and other property rights.
49  For example 
there is a ready cross-referencing between the compulsory licensing of IPRs and essential 
facility-type cases.
50  T h u s  Magill  (compulsory licensing of IPRS)
51, was much cited in 
Bronner (essential facility-type case)
52. Nonetheless, a clear distinction is drawn between the 
cases in that there is an extra element to the exceptional circumstances test in IPRs cases 
viz. that the refusal to licence must prevent the emergence of a new product.  While it is 
important not to overstate the differences between the two, a number of writers refer to the 
tensions between IP law and competition law due to the expansion of IPRs.
53  
Whether IP law is equated with tangible property rights or not, the potential for friction 
between the two legal domains exists and the dilemma is how the two systems can best seek 
to indirectly control markets where IP plays a role.  This risk is that both domains will be 
irrelevant e.g. the early experience with cyber space.  Alternatively and more pertinently, the 
risks are either that there will be productive disintegration as between the two systems or their 
attempt to control the market will produce disintegrative effects on the market.  Under this 
analysis there is no hierarchy between the domains.  Neither can control the other, influence 
is indirect.  Nonetheless, because of the linkages between the two domains – e.g. litigation, a 
common commitment to promote innovation – the two domains are forced (or should be), to 
process at the same time and repeatedly their reaction to externalities such as events in the 
market.  Lianos suggests that the discourse of regulation (I would suggest regulatory law) is 
better suited to constructive dialectic relation between competition law and IP law.
54  This is 
because such a conception allows for the internalisation of competition concerns within IP 
law.  I would suggest that this cannot be a one-way street and that the internalisation of IP 
concerns within competition law is also necessary.  This can be done at the statutory level 
e.g. through the Software Directive as Lianos suggests and on the competition side through 
block exemptions.  This is not sufficient however as the iterative processes of reflexive law 
require that the internalisation of IP law and competition law concerns become part of ex 
poste conflict resolution also.  The suggestion that each domain should seek to indirectly 
influence the other so it can self-regulate to take account of competition/IP concerns has a 
policy dimension and a practical legal dimension but also on a more fundamental level is 
important to ensure that the two legal domains can develop in a manner that is both legally 
coherent, consistent and relevant for the market so that the two domains do not undermine 
their respective internal coherence and structure.  
 
Exploitative Abuses and Regulatory Law 
 
In the specific context of exploitative abuses, what evidence is there of the regulatory 
trilemma and its resolution?  In general, A82 is not a general provision for the regulation of 
prices.
55  And while A82(a) does refer to unfair prices, the Commission has wisely steered 
clear of basing decisions on excessive pricing and where it has been alleged has rejected a 
test based on costs+ or applied it in the context of a recently liberalised sector where the 
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2004); in relation to copyright H Laddie, ‘Copyright: Over-strength, Over-regulated, Over-rated?’ in Innovation, 
Incentive and Rewards: Intellectual Property Law and Policy (1997) 5(3) Hume Papers on Public Policy pp. 1-17.  
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dominant undertaking retained a monopoly position.  In doing so, the internal coherence of 
A82 is retained.  And excessive pricing allegations or findings are even rarer in relation to 
IPRs.  Where the competition agency ends up as a price regulator most notably in the context 
of findings of exclusionary abuse (refusal to supply) the remedy involves licensing on 
reasonable terms. If subsequently there is a suggestion that the licence fees are not 
reasonable (i.e. excessive) then not only does the agency (or their agent) end up as a price 
regulator but also has to apply a test that is generally seen as ambiguous and vague and one 
to be invoked only in obvious, indefensible and serious cases.  The difficulty here is that the 
role of competition law and the competition agency is corroded by the remedy offered with the 
need to monitor prices at odds with the emphasis in competition law of price being determined 
by competitive markets.  This is why compulsory licensing can only be imposed in exceptional 
circumstances – not just to protect the freedom of contract but also to ensure the integrity of 




The key question is how to ensure productive disintegration for competition law and IPR in 
those marginal but important cases where they interact.  There are two suggestions that can 
be made.  First, in the context of conflict resolution one way forward is to examine procedural 
issues such as the burden of proof and rules relating to standing.  It would be useful to 
address questions such as: who should decide a dispute? How? At what level 
(national/supra-national/international)? Using which legal tools?  For what sort of remedy?  
Also, by limiting analysis to IPR and competition issues the analysis is arguably too simplistic 
especially in the EU context where in particular regard should be had to the market integration 
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